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Abstract
This paper studies the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov
chain model with time-varying transition probabilities. The probabilities are parame-
terized as nonlinear functions of variables suggested by the currency crisis and optimal
currency area literature. Results using annual data indicate that in°ation, and to a
lesser extent, output growth and trade openness help explain the exchange rate regime
transition dynamics.
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Résumé 
 
Pour étudier la dynamique du passage entre différents régimes de taux de change, 
cet article utilise un modèle markovien dont les probabilités de transition varient dans le 
temps. Ces probabilités sont modélisées par des fonctions non linéaires de variables que 
nous ont suggérées les littératures sur les zones monétaires optimales et sur les crises de 
change. En nous basant sur des données annuelles, nous trouvons que l'inflation et, dans 
une moindre mesure, la croissance de la production et l'ouverture au commerce 
expliqueraient en partie les dynamiques de transition des régimes de taux de change. 
 
Mots clés:  taux de change, hollowing out hypothesis, changement de régime, chaîne de 
Markov, taux de change fixe, taux de change flottant 
 
1 Introduction
Advocates of the \hollowing out" hypothesis argue that the increase in capital mobility would
tend to make intermediate exchange rate regimes (for example, adjustable pegs, bands, or
dirty °oating) disappear, in favor of the extremes of currency boards or monetary union
on the one hand, and freely °exible exchange rates on the other [see Eichengreen (1994),
Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), and Fischer (2001)]. Underlying this view is the presumption
that the abandonment of intermediate exchange rate regimes would not be the result of a
voluntary choice. Instead, if countries attempted to maintain an intermediate regime until
forced to exit, it would be the result of a speculative attack [see Eichengreen et al. (1999)].
The adoption of a regime would be less the result of o±cial policy than of speculators' actions.
An exchange rate peg would give way to a °oating currency if the former was unsustainable
as a result of over-expansionary domestic credit (as in ¯rst generation models), or low growth
and high unemployment (as in second generation models). In principle, the abandonment
of an intermediate exchange rate regime in a crisis could also involve a move to a currency
board or monetary union, though in practice this is less frequent.
A parallel and equally in°uential literature on exchange rate regime choice is derived from
Mundell's seminal paper on optimum currency areas (OCA). The structural characteristics
of an economy should in°uence whether a country would choose to share a common currency
with another. These characteristics include, for example, the correlation (symmetry) and
e®ect of shocks and the mobility of labor [Mundell (1961)]. Other factors have also been
suggested as important for the choice of exchange rate regime, such as the existence of ¯scal
transfers, the degree of openness, and the extent of diversi¯cation of production [see Masson
and Taylor (1993) for a survey]. Though there have been numerous attempts to explain
regime choice using OCA models, the variables implied by the theory have not been very
successful in accounting for the observed exchange rate regimes [see, for example, Frankel
and Rose (1998), Mussa et al. (2000), and Juhn and Mauro (2001)]. Poirson (2001) reports
some success of traditional OCA variables and political factors in explaining regime choice.
Masson (2001) argues that a strategy to test the hollowing out hypothesis is to look at
the matrix of transition probabilities between di®erent exchange rate regimes.1 Speci¯cally,
one can test whether there are transitions away from intermediate regimes, but not towards
them. This condition is both necessary and su±cient for hollowing out. Using two di®erent
exchange rate regime classi¯cations, the data generally reject the hollowing out hypothesis
for all time periods when all countries are included. When the sample is restricted to the
1Markov chains have been used in other contexts to study the properties of long-run distributions, for
instance by Quah (1993) and Kremer et al. (2001).
[1]
decade of the 1990s for the emerging market countries only, and for only one of the two
regime classi¯cations, the data cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no exits from
currency boards, implying that this regime would eventually dominate. Such a conclusion
contrasts with the predictions of OCA models, which imply that a degree of exchange rate
°exibility would be desirable, hence that countries would prefer an intermediate regime.
This paper estimates a Markov chain model of exchange rate regime transitions with
time-varying probabilities. In particular, the transition probabilities between exchange rate
regimes are speci¯ed to be nonlinear functions of the explanatory variables. The explanatory
variables are those implied by both OCA and currency crisis models. Results indicate that
in many cases, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of constant transition probabilities,
in favor of an alternative where in°ation, trade openness, output growth, and/or reserves
help determine exchange rate regime transitions. We also study whether, conditioning
on unchanged explanatory variables, transitions have changed over time. For instance, if
capital mobility has increased, then the currency crisis literature predicts that transitions
away from intermediate regimes should increase. Finally, we test whether industrial and
developing countries can be considered to be part of the same sample, or whether they form
distinct groups. The latter point has been argued by, for example, Hausman et al. (1999)
and Calvo and Reinhart (2002), who suggest reasons why developing countries do not bene¯t
from exchange rate °exibility.
Markov chains are also a natural framework to test the predictive power of models that
seek to explain the observed distribution of exchange rate regimes. According to currency
crisis models, abandonment of pegs should be more frequent when countries with pegs ex-
perienced excessive domestic credit growth, overvalued exchange rates, or weak economic
activity. According to OCA models, exchange rate regime transitions should result from
changes in structural characteristics. These two models are not mutually exclusive. For
example, if forced to exit from an adjustable peg, a country's authorities may then have the
choice between a hard peg and a free °oat, so both currency crisis and optimum currency
area criteria could be relevant. Second generation currency crisis models acknowledge that
exit could be a deliberate choice of the authorities, even if provoked by speculation. Thus,
a model explaining transitions between exchange rate regimes may include variables implied
by both OCA (or other structural) models and currency crisis models.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 describes models exchange rate
regime choice that motivate our empirical analysis. Section 3 explains the use of Markov
chains to model exchange rate regime transitions. Section 4 reports empirical results and
examines the ability of the estimated Markov chain model to forecast exchange rate regime
transitions. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses avenues for future research.
[2]
2 Models of Voluntary and Involuntary Exchange Rate
Regime Choice
The main di®erence between OCA (and other structural) and currency crisis models is that
the former assume that the exchange rate regime choice is the outcome of a voluntary decision
by the monetary authorities. The latter explain the involuntary exit from an exchange rate
peg as triggered by the actions of speculators. If a forced exit involves a choice between the
alternative regimes, then voluntary and involuntary elements would both be present.
Among the models of voluntary choice of regime, those broadly characterized as opti-
mum currency area models have attracted the most attention. In principle, these models
should use exogenous structural features of the economy to explain the voluntary choices of
the policy authorities. Frankel and Rose (1998) question the exogeneity of some of these
variables. Subject to this caveat, several OCA variables have unambiguous implications
for the choice of exchange rate regime choice. Poirson [Poirson (2001, Table A4)] identi¯es
trade openness, the existence of a dominant trading partner, labor mobility, and nominal
°exibility as variables associated with a ¯xed exchange rate regime; and economic develop-
ment, diversi¯cation of production and exports, and (large) size of the economy as variables
associated with a °oating exchange rate regime. Poirson identi¯es two other sets of models,
namely those inspired by political economy [especially Collins (1996) and Edwards (1996)]
and by \fear of °oating" [Calvo and Reinhart (2002)]. Political economy or \fear of °oating"
variables that have been suggested to in°uence regime choice include the extent of foreign
currency debt and dollarization, the degree of central bank credibility, and the size of re-
serves. However, some of these variables are very hard to measure, while others are clearly
endogenous.
First generation currency crisis models describe the process by which foreign exchange
reserves are depleted by speculators [see, for example, Krugman (1979)]. Speculators cor-
rectly anticipate that the authorities will not be able to maintain the peg. In the simplest
monetary model, the peg is unsustainable because domestic credit expansion is too rapid. In
more elaborate models, the peg is unsustainable because the real exchange rate is overvalued
or the ¯scal de¯cit is too large.
In second generation models, the authorities are assumed to decide whether to maintain
a peg in the light of variables that enter their objective function. Assuming that they care
about both the real economy (e.g., the rate of unemployment) and price (or exchange rate)
stability, shocks to the real economy may a®ect the trade-o® between them and lead to
a greater willingness to sacri¯ce price (or exchange rate) stability and hence abandon an
exchange rate peg.
[3]
Currency crisis models suggest a set of largely endogenous variables as determinants of
the exchange rate regime. These variables include the rate of domestic credit expansion,
the ¯scal de¯cit, the level of reserves, the real exchange rate, the rate of unemployment,
the growth rate of GDP, and the in°ation rate. In addition, these models suggest that the
degree of capital account openness should matter for the vulnerability to speculative attack.
Most models assume perfect capital mobility, but if the economy is cut o® from world
capital markets, it may not be forced to abandon a peg even in the face of a fundamental
disequilibrium.
3 Markov Chains
A Markov chain is a simple stochastic structure that can summarize the transition between
exchange rate regimes. De¯ne by st the exchange rate regime in period t: In the analysis that
follows, st is assumed to take either of three possible values: st = 1 denotes a ¯xed exchange
rate regime, st = 3 denotes a °oating exchange rate, and st = 2 denotes an intermediate
exchange rate regime. The Markov chain is de¯ned by three objects. First, the state-space
set, St; that contains the possible values the state variable can take (in this case, 1; 2; or 3).
Second, the 3£ 3 matrix of transition probabilities, P; with elements pij for i; j = 1;2; 3 :
P =
2
64
p11 p12 p13
p21 p22 p23
p31 p32 p33
3
75 : (1)
The typical element pij = Pr(st = j jst¡1 = i) is the probability that the current regime is j
given that the regime in the previous period was i: Third, the 1£ 3 vector ¼t that records
the proportion of countries in each of the three regimes at time t: The matrix P satis¯esP
j
pij = 1 for j = 1; 2;3: That is, the elements of P add up to one across rows. The vector
¼t satis¯es
P
i
¼t;i = 1; where ¼t;i is the typical element of ¼t: The distribution of exchange
rate regimes evolves over time following the law:
¼t = ¼t¡1P: (2)
Iterating forward on (2) delivers the distribution at some point in the inde¯nite future :
¼ = lim
t!1
¼0P
t; (3)
where ¼0 denotes the initial distribution at time t = 0: Provided that the Markov chain is
ergodic, meaning that the matrix P has a single unit eigenvalue, the long-run distribution
¼ is independent of the initial distribution and can be termed the invariant distribution.
[4]
The hypothesis of hollowing out of intermediate regimes implies that the second element
of ¼ is 0. That is, the long-run distribution of exchange rate regimes is concentrated in either
one or both of the tails. This is only possible, if either the ¯x, °oating, or both regimes are
absorbing states (i.e., p11 = 1 and/or p33 = 1) so that other states cannot be reached from
them, or else ¯xed and °oating exchange rate regimes together constitute a closed set. In
this case, transitions between them can take place but not towards the intermediate regime
(i.e., both p12 = 0 and p32 = 0). See Masson (2001) for further details.
In the above discussion, the transition probabilities in P are assumed to be constant.
However, it seems likely that economic variables could a®ect the probability of a country's
transition from one exchange rate regime to another. A simple way to allow time-varying
transition probabilities in Markov chains involves the nonlinear parameterization of the prob-
abilities in terms of a set of predetermined explanatory variables. Pesaran and Ruge-Murcia
(1999) follow this approach to model the realignment probability in exchange rate target
zones. Variables suggested by the currency crisis and OCA literatures are natural variables
to explain exchange rate regime transitions. This extension is important to examine the hol-
lowing out hypothesis because transitions away or into intermediate exchange rate regimes
might be less or more frequent depending on economic conditions.
In order to economize on notation, the function that links transition probabilities and
explanatory variables is de¯ned as pij(Xt¡1), where Xt¡1 is a m£ 1 vector of predetermined
variables (including a constant) and pij (Xt¡1) : Rm ! [0; 1]. We adopt a functional form
that imposes the constraints that the transition probability is bounded between zero and
one, and that each row of the matrix P sums to one. For example for row 3 :
p31(Xt¡1) = exp(¯
0
31
Xt¡1)=[1 + exp(¯
0
31
Xt¡1) + exp(¯
0
32
Xt¡1)];
p32(Xt¡1) = exp(¯
0
32
Xt¡1)=[1 + exp(¯
0
31
Xt¡1) + exp(¯
0
32
Xt¡1)];
p33(Xt¡1) = 1=[1 + exp(¯
0
31
Xt¡1) + exp(¯
0
32
Xt¡1)];
where ¯ij is a m£ 1 vector of coe±cients. The case studied by Masson (2001) corresponds
to the special case where the only element in Xt¡1 is a constant term.
Notice that even if a given transition is infrequent (but nonzero) in the data, the nonlin-
earity of the model helps identify the coe±cients of variables that determine this transition.
To see this, suppose that the transition from °oating to ¯xed exchange rates is infrequent,
meaning that the econometrician does not have very many observations of this transition
in the data set. In terms of the above equations, one would think that the coe±cients in
¯
31
are poorly (perhaps, not) identi¯ed. However, due to the restrictions that probabilities
are bounded between zero and one, and that each row of the matrix P sums to one, ¯
31
[5]
also appears in the equations that describe the transition probabilities p32 and p33: If these
transitions are more frequent in the data, the coe±cients in ¯
31
can be identi¯ed fully.
The Markov property of the model implies that the probability of observing a given
sequence of exchange rate regimes in country k is given by:
L(k) = ¼0;i;k
Y
i
Y
j
(pij;k(Xt¡1))
nijk ; (4)
where nijk is the number of times that there occurs a one-period transition from state i to
state j in country k: For the complete sample of K countries, the log likelihood function
is constructed by taking logs on both sides of (4) for each country and summing up over
k = 1; 2; : : : ; K to obtain:
logL =
X
k
log L(k) = A+
X
k
X
i
X
j
nijk ln pij;k(Xt¡1);
where A =
P
k
log(¼0;i;k) is a constant term. This log likelihood function can be maximized
numerically using standard procedures to obtain e±cient and consistent estimates of the
model parameters.
Note that when the relation between pij and Xt¡1 is given by the logit function, this log
likelihood function corresponds exactly to the one of a multinomial logit model. The parallel
between discrete choice models and the Markov chain with time-varying probabilities means
that one could give a structural interpretation to the model. Speci¯cally, conditional on the
current exchange rate regime and a set of observable variables, Xt¡1, each country chooses
whether to remain in the current regime or to switch to either of the alternative regimes.2
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Data
For the estimation of the Markov chain models, we use data on exchange rate regime classi¯-
cation and four explanatory variables, namely, in°ation, trade openness, growth, and reserves
between 1975 and 1997 (inclusive). Excluding missing observations, the data set contains
2430 exchange rate transitions for 168 countries. The classi¯cation of regimes was obtained
from Ghosh et al. (1997). The data for the explanatory variables was obtained from the
2Notice, however, that we do not model the (potential) choice of Xt; even though some of the variables in
this vector could be endogenous. A formal treatment of this problemwould require the complete speci¯ cation
of the government's optimization problem [for example, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001)].
At the econometric level, the possible endogeneity of Xt is addressed by including only lagged values of the
variables among the regressors.
[6]
IMF International Financial Statistics. In°ation was measured by the annual percentage
change in the price level. Trade openness was measured by the ratio of imports plus exports
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Growth was measured by the annual real growth rate
of GDP. Reserves were measured by international reserves minus gold over GDP.3
The Ghosh et al. classi¯cation exhibits more stability in regimes than that of Levy
Yeyati and Sturnegger (1999), because the latter is based solely on the behavior of two
indicator variables, the exchange rate itself and foreign exchange reserves. While de facto
¯xity or °exibility is of interest in itself, it ignores the stated commitment of the authorities.
Arguably, it is this commitment that is central to the distinction between regimes. In
addition, a feature of the Ghosh et al. classi¯cation identi¯ed in Masson (2001) was the
possibility that there might be transitions toward currency boards (hard pegs) but not away
from them, a feature that eventually would produce hollowing out. Hence, the interest in
analyzing the determinants of these transitions.
4.2 Preliminary Analysis of the Data
Consider Figure 1 that plots the proportion of all countries in each exchange rate regime in
each year of the sample.4 In terms of the notation introduced in Section 3, these ¯gures
correspond to the unconditional distribution of regimes ¼t in each year of the sample. Two
observations are apparent from this Figure. First, there has been a persistent decline in the
proportion of countries under ¯xed exchange rate regimes, even after the break down of the
Bretton Woods system. Second, there was a sharp increase in the number of transitions from
intermediate to °oating exchange regimes in the early 1990s. The proportion of countries
under °oating rose from 10.3 percent in 1990 to 33.9 percent in 1994. These numbers
re°ect both transitions in existing countries (like Finland's in 1992) and the addition to
the sample of new countries that adopted °oating exchange rate regimes (like Latvia and
Lithuania). However, this trend has been partly reversed since 1994. This ¯gure is not
entirely supportive of the hollowing out hypothesis whereby intermediate exchange rate
regimes would disappear in favor of either ¯xed or freely °exible exchange rates, and suggest
a richer transition dynamics than this hypothesis would imply.
Most of the evidence for hollowing out has been based on data from emerging and devel-
oped economies [for example, see Fischer (2001)]. Figures 2 and 3 plot the unconditional
3In order to limit the e®ect of outliers on the results, the variables were reparameterized as x=(1 + x)
where x is either in°ation, trade openness, GDP growth, or reserves/GDP.
4Since there are missing observations for some countries, and some countries (e.g., Estonia) did not exist
for the whole sample period, the total number of countries is not the same in all years, varying from 127 in
1975 to 168 in 1997.
[7]
distribution of exchange rate regimes for developed and emerging countries in each year
of the sample, respectively. The countries classi¯ed as \developed" are Austria, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Finland, Denmark, France, Hong Kong, Germany, Japan, Ireland, New
Zealand, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Singapore, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. This list was taken from Fischer (2001, p. 7),
and is originally based on the list of developed market economies produced by Morgan Stan-
ley Capital International (MSCI). The countries classi¯ed as \emerging" are Argentina,
Bulgaria, Panama, China, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Greece,
Turkey, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South
Africa, and Thailand. This list was also taken from Fischer (2001, p. 8).5 These are the
economies included in the MCSI emerging market index and/or the Emerging Index Plus
(EMBI+) of J. P. Morgan.
Three observations are apparent from Figures 2 and 3. First, for both sets of countries
there is no discernible time trend in the proportion of countries under ¯xed exchange rate
regimes.6 Hence the downward trend reported for the complete sample above is caused by
countries that are neither developed nor emerging economies. Second, until the early 1990s
there was no trend in the proportion of developed economies under intermediate or °oating
exchange rate regimes. After the early 1990s, there is a strong downward (upward) trend in
the number of developed economies under intermediate (°oating) exchange rate regime, but
these trends are partly reversed after 1994. Third, there is a persistent downward (upward)
trend in the number of emerging economies under intermediate (°oating) exchange rate
regime. It is clear from these Figures that further understanding of the determinants of
exchange rate regime transitions would be desirable.
Table 1 reports ML estimates of the Markov chain obtained using all countries in the
sample under the assumption that the transition probabilities are constant. In addition to
the whole period from 1975 to 1997, we considered two subperiods: 1975 to 1989 and 1990
to 1997. Notice that in all cases, the null hypothesis that the ¯xed and °oating exchange
rate regimes are absorbing states (that is, p11 = 1 or p33 = 1) is rejected by the data at
standard signi¯cance levels. This means that after adopting a ¯xed or a °oating exchange
rate regime, there is a nonnegligible probability that the country will exit from that regime in
¯nite time. Since p12 and p32 are statistically di®erent from zero, but p13 and p31 are not, a
country that exits one of the polar regimes is most likely to adopt an intermediate exchange
5Our list of emerging countries di®ers from Fischer's, who also includes Taiwan.
6For example, if one runs an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of these proportions on a constant
and a time trend, the coe±cient on the time trend is not signi¯ cantly di®erent from zero.
[8]
rate regime. Since the ¯xed and °oating exchange rate regimes are neither absorbing states
nor form a closed set, the invariant distribution of regimes would contain a nonzero mass
at the intermediate regime. (See Panel B in Table 1.) In this sense, one would reject the
hypothesis of hollowing out. [See Masson (2001).]
Since the null hypothesis p13 = 0 and p31 = 0 cannot be rejected at standard levels,
the analysis that follows imposes the constraint p13 = p31 = 0: Imposing this restriction
increases the e±ciency of the estimated parameters and allows the formal statistical compar-
ison of the transition dynamics across subperiods. De¯ne by µ^1 and µ^2 the column vector of
ML estimates of the transition probabilities obtained using data for the periods 1975-1989
and 1990-1997, respectively. Similarly, de¯ne by V^1 and V^2 the variance-covariance matrix
of these estimates. Andrews and Fair (1988) show that under the null hypothesis µ1 = µ2;
the Wald statistic:
W = (µ^1 ¡ µ^2)
0(V^1 + V^2)
¡1(µ^1 ¡ µ^2);
is distributed chi-square with as many degrees of freedom as the number of elements in µ^:
The application of this stability test for our model yields a statistic W = 44:4: Comparing
this statistic with the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square distribution with four degrees
of freedom indicates that the null hypothesis that the exchange rate transition dynamics are
the same before and after 1990 is strongly rejected by the data. From Table 1, it appears
that the di®erence arises from the fact that the polar regimes are more persistent (though
still not absorbing) after 1990, while the intermediate exchange rate regime is less persistent.
Note that the qualitative conclusions regarding hollowing out appear robust to the sample
period considered.
Table 2 reports ML estimates of the Markov chain obtained using the subsamples of
developed and emerging market economies under the assumption that the transition proba-
bilities are constant. Comparing these estimates with ones of the full sample for the same
period (1975-1997), indicates that the ¯xed exchange rate regime is less persistent in the
two subsamples than in the full sample. Conclusions regarding the persistence of the other
regimes and the hypothesis of hollowing out are qualitatively similar to the ones reported
for the full sample. In most cases one can reject the null hypothesis that the polar regimes
are absorbing states.7 Hence, there is a positive probability that a developed or emerging
country in either a ¯xed or a °oating exchange rate regime will exit from that regime in
¯nite time. A country that exits one of the polar regimes is most likely to adopt an interme-
diate exchange rate regime. To see this, note that in the case of the developed economies,
p13 = p31 = 0: In the case of emerging market economies, p13 = 0 and p31 is not statistically
7The exception is the ¯xed exchange rate regime for developed countries, for which the null hypothesis
p11 = 1 cannot be rejected at the 5 percent signi¯cance level.
[9]
di®erent from zero at standard levels. Since the ¯xed and °oating exchange rate regimes are
neither absorbing states nor form a closed set, the invariant distribution of regimes would
contain a nonzero mass at the intermediate regime. The invariant distribution of regimes is
reported in Panel B in Table 2.
Since Andrews and Fair's test measures the distance between point estimates of di®erent
samples, one could compare the transition dynamics of developed and emerging market
economies using the Wald test described above. The Wald statistic is 2.83. Since this value
is less than the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square variable with four degrees of freedom,
the hypothesis that the transition dynamics are the same in both sets of countries cannot be
rejected.8 However, we will see below that the assumption of ¯xed transition probabilities
obscures in fact di®erent determinants of exchange rate regime transitions in developed and
emerging economies.
4.3 All Countries
We now endogenize the exchange rate regime transitions using explanatory variables sug-
gested by the optimum currency area literature and currency crisis models. Recall that the
null hypothesis p13 = 0 and p31 = 0 cannot be rejected for any sample period or country
sample. This means that when a country that exits one of the polar regimes, it is most
likely to adopt an intermediate exchange rate regime. Consequently, we concentrate in this
Section on the transitions from ¯xed and °oating to intermediate exchange rate regimes, and
in transitions away from intermediate exchange rate regimes.9 The explanatory variables
included are lagged annual in°ation, lagged openness to trade, lagged GDP growth, and
lagged foreign exchange reserves over GDP. Panel A in Table 3 reports the estimates of the
coe±cients on the explanatory variables for the complete sample.
Each of the variables has at least one signi¯cant coe±cient, but the coe±cient on in°ation
is statistically signi¯cant in all transitions. Estimates imply that in°ation increases the
probability of leaving a ¯xed exchange rate regime for an intermediate regime, and of leaving
an intermediate regime for a freely °oating exchange rate regime. This result re°ects the
fact that ¯xed and managed regimes might not be sustainable when the in°ation rate is high.
Interestingly, in°ation also increases the probability of leaving an intermediate regime for a
8Since Andrews and Fair's test was designed to test the hypothesis of structural stability in a time series,
rather than across time series, this result should be interpreted with caution and is best regarded as indicative
only.
9Results obtained when the restriction p13 = p31 = 0 is not imposed are basically the same as those
reported below. In preliminary work we also considered adding one explanatory variable at the time with
similar results to the ones reported. All these results are available from the corresponding author upon
request.
[10]
¯xed exchange rate. An explanation of this result is that the ¯xed and managed regimes
might serve as commitment mechanisms to reduce in°ation (for example, as in Israel in 1986
and Argentina in 1991).
Trade openness decreases and low growth increases the probability of going from a ¯xed
to an intermediate regime, and from an intermediate to a °oating exchange rate regime.
It seems that as with high in°ation, the unpleasant consequences of low growth lead to a
change in regime, whether initiated by the authorities or by private investors. Finally, a low
level of international reserves/GDP increases the probability of going from an intermediate
to a °oating exchange rate regime.
The null hypothesis of constant transition probabilities can be tested against the alterna-
tive of time-varying transition probabilities by means of a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. This
is basically a joint test of the restriction that the coe±cients on in°ation, trade openness,
growth, and reserves are all zero. The test statistic is 72:08. Under the null hypothesis
of constant transition probabilities, this statistic is distributed chi-square with 16 degrees of
freedom. Since the statistic is well above the 5 percent critical value, the hypothesis can be
rejected. Hence, variables implied by the OCA and currency crisis literature are helpful in
explaining exchange rate regime transitions.
Results for the subsamples 1975-1989 and 1990-1997 are reported, respectively, in Panels
B and C in Tables 3. Notice that they are qualitatively similar to the ones for the complete
sample in Table. However, point estimates are su±ciently apart that the Wald test of
stability rejects the null hypothesis that estimates are the same in both subsamples: the
statistic isW = 51:047; that is well above the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square variable
with 20 degrees of freedom. Hence, the quantitative role of the variables that explain
exchange rate regime transition might have changed after 1990 as capital mobility increased.
4.4 Developed vs Emerging Market Economies
Finally, we compare exchange rate regime transitions for developed and emerging market
economies. Since both sets of countries face a high degree of capital mobility, it is interesting
to examine whether their transition dynamics are driven by the same factors.
Estimates for developed countries are reported in Panel D in Table 3. Empirical results
indicate that low growth increases the probability of going from an intermediate to a °oating
exchange rate regime in developed market economies. No other variable explains transitions
for this subsample. The large numerical values of the coe±cients that explain the transition
from a ¯xed to a managed regime re°ect the small number of observations of this transition
in the data set. Estimates for emerging countries are reported in Panel E in Table 3.
[11]
In°ation, reserves/GDP, and (in one case) trade openness are important in explaining the
exchange rate regime transitions in emerging markets. In°ation makes more likely the
transition from a ¯xed to an intermediate regime, but also makes more likely the transition
from intermediate to ¯x, and from °oating to intermediate regimes. This would seem to
re°ect both the use by emerging market countries of exchange rate based stabilizations to
disin°ate after periods of high in°ation, and the inability of many countries to maintain
adjustable pegs in the face of high in°ation.
Reserves/GDP appear to explain the transition between ¯xed and intermediate regimes
for emerging markets but not for developed economies. This result suggest that freer
access to international capital markets on the part of developed economies makes the level of
reserves less of a constraint. On the basis of these point estimates, the exchange rate regime
transition dynamics appears quite di®erent in emerging markets from those of developed
economies.10 In particular, these results give some support to the views of Hausman et
al. (1999) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) that developing countries may not bene¯t from
exchange rate °exibility in the same way as developed economies.
4.5 Case Studies
This Section examines the ability of the estimated Markov chain model to forecast exchange
rate regime transitions. We focus on four recent prominent events. The transition from
intermediate to °oating exchange rate regimes by Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Italy in
1992; by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea in 1997; and by Mexico in late 1994; and
the transition from intermediate to ¯xed exchange rate regime by Argentina in 1991.11
Consider ¯rst Figure 4 that contains the estimated probability of a transition from inter-
mediate to °oating exchange rate regimes by Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Italy in 1992.
This estimated probability corresponds to the ¯tted value of the model for this transition
using as explanatory variables the rate of in°ation, trade openness, GDP growth, and re-
serves/GDP (all lagged) and the coe±cients reported in Panel D in Table 3. The large spike
for Norway in 1978 is associated with a severe recession in that year when output fell by
around 4 percent on an annual basis. Notice that the transition probability rises for most
10Notice, however, that the Wald statistic of the null hypothesis that the coe±cients in both subsamples
are the same is only W = 17:25: Since, this statistic is below the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square
variable with 20 degrees of freedom, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Given the small number of countries
in each sample and the imprecision with which some of the coe±cients are estimated, it is possible that this
result re°ects low test power.
11Our approach di®ers from currency crisis models in that we model a larger number of transitions rather
than just a crisis event. Moreover, we consider changes in o±cial exchange rate regimes, not crises de¯ned
as combinations of large movements in exchange rates and large movements in foreign exchange reserves.
For a survey of the literature that attempts to predict currency crises, see Berg and Pattillo (1999).
[12]
countries after 1989, and in the case of Finland reaches 26 percent in the year prior to the
change in regime. For the other countries the predicted probability for this transition rises
to between 4 and 12 percent.
The model is not successful in predicting the exchange rate regime transitions in South
East Asia in 1997 and in Mexico in the early 1990s.12 The estimated transition probabilities
for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea are plotted in Figure 5. Note that they do not
change much in the year(s) prior to the crisis and in all cases are below 3 percent in 1996.
In the case of Mexico (see Figure 6), the transition probability does increase somewhat prior
to the transition, but is not very high by historical levels and reaches only roughly 5 percent
in the year prior to the transition. There are two possible explanations for this result. First,
annual data are likely to be too coarse to explain speculative attacks that take place in
a matter of weeks. Second, as suggested by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001),
current fundamentals might not be able to account for the Asian currency crisis if they were
the result of future expected (as opposed to current) in°ation.
Finally, Figure 7 plots the probability of a transition from an intermediate to a ¯xed
exchange rate regime in Argentina in 1991. Since in°ation is an important explanatory
variable for this transition in emerging market economies, the transition probability rises
after 1988 to reach roughly 30 percent in the year prior to the transition.
5 Conclusions
Results suggest that a fruitful way of obtaining some understanding of the distribution
of exchange rate regimes is to try to explain transitions between regimes. Currency crisis
models and the optimum currency area literature both imply that particular variables should
help explain transitions. Estimates con¯rm that these variables have signi¯cant explanatory
power, but case studies indicate that they do not always have a good forecasting power.
When the sample includes all countries, high in°ation, and to a lesser extent low growth and
low trade openness, tend to increase exits from the prevailing regime. This is consistent with
currency crisis models (when considering the exits from intermediate or ¯xed regimes), but
also with the voluntary use of ¯xed or quasi-¯xed rates in exchange-rate-based stabilizations.
In contrast, the level of reserves seems to have a less systematic impact. Reserves are
signi¯cant in explaining transitions only for emerging market countries. This suggests that
capital mobility may be lower for these economies than for the developed countries (that
may have access to international capital markets even in a crisis).
12For these cases, we use the coe±cients for emerging market countries reported in Panel E in Table 3.
[13]
What do these results have to say about hollowing out? Estimates suggest that low
in°ation and sustained growth may be the key to making intermediate (and other) regimes
sustainable. To the extent that in°ation decreases in emerging market economies (as it
has done in many of them), and growth can be maintained, such regimes as soft pegs may
be able to resist speculative attacks. It is in bad times, measured by both variables, that
regimes are especially vulnerable.
We have been unable to get a proxy for capital mobility for a su±cient number of countries
to include it as an explanatory variable. However, to the extent that increasing capital
mobility makes emerging market economies resemble the advanced countries in our sample,
the level of reserves should become less important as a determinant for exchange rate regime
transitions.
[14]
Table 1: Estimated Transition Matrix and Invariant Distribution
All Countries
1975¡ 1989 1990¡ 1997 1975 ¡ 1997
N = 1471 N = 959 N = 2430
Panel A. Transition Matrix
0:918¤ 0:081¤ 0 0:968¤ 0:026¤ 0:006 0:934¤ 0:064¤ 0:002
(0:015) (0:015) (0:014) (0:013) (0:006) (0:011) (0:011) (0:002)
0:013¤ 0:976¤ 0:010¤ 0:0035 0:929¤ 0:067¤ 0:010¤ 0:960¤ 0:030¤
(0:004) (0:005) (0:003) (0:0025) (0:010) (0:011) (0:002) (0:005) (0:004)
0 0:033y 0:967 0:0084 0:093¤ 0:899¤ 0:006 0:076¤ 0:918¤
(0:019) (0:019) (0:0059) (0:019) (0:020) (0:004) (0:015) (0:015)
Panel B. Invariant Distribution
0:110 0:675 0:215 0:146 0:507 0:347 0:120 0:641 0:240
Notes: N is the number of observations. The superscripts ¤ and y denote statistical signif-
icance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The ¯gures in parenthesis are standard
errors.
[15]
Table 2: Estimated Transition Matrix and Invariant Distribution,
Developed and Emerging Market Countries
(1975-1997)
Developed Emerging Markets
N = 478 N = 604
Panel A. Transition Matrix
0:857¤ 0:143 0 0:857¤ 0:143¤ 0
(0:093) (0:093) (0:054) (0:054)
0:003 0:972¤ 0:025¤ 0:008¤ 0:966¤ 0:025
(0:003) (0:009) (0:004) (0:008) (0:007)
0 0:029¤ 0:971¤ 0:016 0:078¤ 0:906¤
(0:014) (0:014) (0:015) (0:034) (0:036)
Panel B. Invariant Distribution
0:011 0:532 0:455 0:065 0:736 0:198
Notes: see notes to Table 1. N is the number of observations.
[16]
Table 3: Coe±cients of Explanatory Variables of Transition Probabilities
Coe±cients In°ation Openness Growth Reserves
Panel A. All Countries (1975-1997)
¯
12
6:47¤ ¡2:37y ¡5:28¤ 2:17
¯
21
2:79¤ ¡0:09 ¡2:09 ¡0:58
¯
23
1:49¤ ¡2:11¤ ¡3:75y ¡2:84¤
¯
32
2:54¤ 0:86 ¡0:95 0:93
Panel B. All Countries (1975-1989)
¯12 10:25
¤ ¡2:03 ¡5:39y 3:11¤
¯21 2:21
y 0:86 ¡4:74 ¡0:42
¯23 ¡1:16 ¡4:91
¤ 2:42 ¡4:57
¯
32
15:22¤ ¡3:25 0:90 4:18
Panel C. All Countries (1990-1997)
¯
12
1:14 ¡3:49 9:41 ¡6:05
¯
21
5:71¤ ¡5:01 8:31 ¡1:22
¯
23
2:02¤ ¡2:19y ¡2:74 ¡3:84¤
¯
32
1:77y 0:98 0:66 0:39
Panel D. Developed Economies (1975-1990)
¯
12
333:91 2036:77 297:88 ¡1480:68
¯21 ¡6:48 2:04 ¡9:23 ¡3:84
¯23 ¡17:54 ¡6:17
y ¡48:23¤ 3:73
¯32 0:53 5:43 25:37 2:05
Panel E. Emerging Economies (1975-1990)
¯
12
7:11y 4:21 2:53 7:38y
¯
21
8:89¤ 10:65¤ 3:96 10:44¤
¯
23
0:52 ¡3:21 ¡5:84 ¡4:71
¯
32
3:52y ¡2:24 4:88 ¡2:45
Notes: see notes to Table 1. ¯ij is a 5 £ 1 vector of coe±cients on lagged annual in°ation,
lagged openness to trade, lagged GDP growth, lagged foreign exchange reserves over GDP,
and a constant term. The sample sizes for panels A, B, C, D, and E, are 2430, 1471, 959,
478, and 604, respectively.
[17]
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